Gov
Abstract
This paper specifies the Governance module of the Cosmos SDK, which was first described in the Cosmos Whitepaper in June 2016.
The module enables Cosmos SDK based blockchain to support an on-chain governance system. In this system, holders of the native staking token of the chain can vote on proposals on a 1 token 1 vote basis. Next is a list of features the module currently supports:
Proposal submission: Users can submit proposals with a deposit. Once the minimum deposit is reached, the proposal enters voting period. The minimum deposit can be reached by collecting deposits from different users (including proposer) within deposit period.
Vote: Participants can vote on proposals that reached MinDeposit and entered voting period.
Inheritance and penalties: Delegators inherit their validator's vote if they don't vote themselves.
Claiming deposit: Users that deposited on proposals can recover their deposits if the proposal was accepted or rejected. If the proposal was vetoed, or never entered voting period (minimum deposit not reached within deposit period), the deposit is burned.
This module is in use on the Cosmos Hub (a.k.a gaia). Features that may be added in the future are described in Future Improvements.
Contents
The following specification uses ATOM as the native staking token. The module can be adapted to any Proof-Of-Stake blockchain by replacing ATOM with the native staking token of the chain.
Concepts
Disclaimer: This is work in progress. Mechanisms are susceptible to change.
The governance process is divided in a few steps that are outlined below:
Proposal submission: Proposal is submitted to the blockchain with a deposit.
Vote: Once deposit reaches a certain value (
MinDeposit
), proposal is confirmed and vote opens. Bonded Atom holders can then sendTxGovVote
transactions to vote on the proposal.Execution After a period of time, the votes are tallied and depending on the result, the messages in the proposal will be executed.
Proposal submission
Right to submit a proposal
Every account can submit proposals by sending a MsgSubmitProposal
transaction. Once a proposal is submitted, it is identified by its unique proposalID
.
Proposal Messages
A proposal includes an array of sdk.Msg
s which are executed automatically if the proposal passes. The messages are executed by the governance ModuleAccount
itself. Modules such as x/upgrade
, that want to allow certain messages to be executed by governance only should add a whitelist within the respective msg server, granting the governance module the right to execute the message once a quorum has been reached. The governance module uses the MsgServiceRouter
to check that these messages are correctly constructed and have a respective path to execute on but do not perform a full validity check.
Deposit
To prevent spam, proposals must be submitted with a deposit in the coins defined by the MinDeposit
param.
When a proposal is submitted, it has to be accompanied with a deposit that must be strictly positive, but can be inferior to MinDeposit
. The submitter doesn't need to pay for the entire deposit on their own. The newly created proposal is stored in an inactive proposal queue and stays there until its deposit passes the MinDeposit
. Other token holders can increase the proposal's deposit by sending a Deposit
transaction. If a proposal doesn't pass the MinDeposit
before the deposit end time (the time when deposits are no longer accepted), the proposal will be destroyed: the proposal will be removed from state and the deposit will be burned (see x/gov EndBlocker
). When a proposal deposit passes the MinDeposit
threshold (even during the proposal submission) before the deposit end time, the proposal will be moved into the active proposal queue and the voting period will begin.
The deposit is kept in escrow and held by the governance ModuleAccount
until the proposal is finalized (passed or rejected).
Deposit refund and burn
When a proposal is finalized, the coins from the deposit are either refunded or burned according to the final tally of the proposal:
If the proposal is approved or rejected but not vetoed, each deposit will be automatically refunded to its respective depositor (transferred from the governance
ModuleAccount
).When the proposal is vetoed with greater than 1/3, deposits will be burned from the governance
ModuleAccount
and the proposal information along with its deposit information will be removed from state.All refunded or burned deposits are removed from the state. Events are issued when burning or refunding a deposit.
Vote
Participants
Participants are users that have the right to vote on proposals. On the Cosmos Hub, participants are bonded Atom holders. Unbonded Atom holders and other users do not get the right to participate in governance. However, they can submit and deposit on proposals.
Note that when participants have bonded and unbonded Atoms, their voting power is calculated from their bonded Atom holdings only.
Voting period
Once a proposal reaches MinDeposit
, it immediately enters Voting period
. We define Voting period
as the interval between the moment the vote opens and the moment the vote closes. The initial value of Voting period
is 2 weeks.
Option set
The option set of a proposal refers to the set of choices a participant can choose from when casting its vote.
The initial option set includes the following options:
Yes
No
NoWithVeto
Abstain
NoWithVeto
counts as No
but also adds a Veto
vote. Abstain
option allows voters to signal that they do not intend to vote in favor or against the proposal but accept the result of the vote.
Note: from the UI, for urgent proposals we should maybe add a ‘Not Urgent’ option that casts a NoWithVeto
vote.
Weighted Votes
ADR-037 introduces the weighted vote feature which allows a staker to split their votes into several voting options. For example, it could use 70% of its voting power to vote Yes and 30% of its voting power to vote No.
Often times the entity owning that address might not be a single individual. For example, a company might have different stakeholders who want to vote differently, and so it makes sense to allow them to split their voting power. Currently, it is not possible for them to do "passthrough voting" and giving their users voting rights over their tokens. However, with this system, exchanges can poll their users for voting preferences, and then vote on-chain proportionally to the results of the poll.
To represent weighted vote on chain, we use the following Protobuf message.
For a weighted vote to be valid, the options
field must not contain duplicate vote options, and the sum of weights of all options must be equal to 1.
Quorum
Quorum is defined as the minimum percentage of voting power that needs to be cast on a proposal for the result to be valid.
Expedited Proposals
A proposal can be expedited, making the proposal use shorter voting duration and a higher tally threshold by its default. If an expedited proposal fails to meet the threshold within the scope of shorter voting duration, the expedited proposal is then converted to a regular proposal and restarts voting under regular voting conditions.
Threshold
Threshold is defined as the minimum proportion of Yes
votes (excluding Abstain
votes) for the proposal to be accepted.
Initially, the threshold is set at 50% of Yes
votes, excluding Abstain
votes. A possibility to veto exists if more than 1/3rd of all votes are NoWithVeto
votes. Note, both of these values are derived from the TallyParams
on-chain parameter, which is modifiable by governance. This means that proposals are accepted iff:
There exist bonded tokens.
Quorum has been achieved.
The proportion of
Abstain
votes is inferior to 1/1.The proportion of
NoWithVeto
votes is inferior to 1/3, includingAbstain
votes.The proportion of
Yes
votes, excludingAbstain
votes, at the end of the voting period is superior to 1/2.
For expedited proposals, by default, the threshold is higher than with a normal proposal, namely, 66.7%.
Inheritance
If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.
If the delegator votes before its validator, it will not inherit from the validator's vote.
If the delegator votes after its validator, it will override its validator vote with its own. If the proposal is urgent, it is possible that the vote will close before delegators have a chance to react and override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as proposals require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass, when tallied at the end of the voting period. Because as little as 1/3 + 1 validation power could collude to censor transactions, non-collusion is already assumed for ranges exceeding this threshold.
Validator’s punishment for non-voting
At present, validators are not punished for failing to vote.
Governance address
Later, we may add permissioned keys that could only sign txs from certain modules. For the MVP, the Governance address
will be the main validator address generated at account creation. This address corresponds to a different PrivKey than the CometBFT PrivKey which is responsible for signing consensus messages. Validators thus do not have to sign governance transactions with the sensitive CometBFT PrivKey.
Burnable Params
There are three parameters that define if the deposit of a proposal should be burned or returned to the depositors.
BurnVoteVeto
burns the proposal deposit if the proposal gets vetoed.BurnVoteQuorum
burns the proposal deposit if the proposal deposit if the vote does not reach quorum.BurnProposalDepositPrevote
burns the proposal deposit if it does not enter the voting phase.
Note: These parameters are modifiable via governance.
State
Constitution
Constitution
is found in the genesis state. It is a string field intended to be used to descibe the purpose of a particular blockchain, and its expected norms. A few examples of how the constitution field can be used:
define the purpose of the chain, laying a foundation for its future development
set expectations for delegators
set expectations for validators
define the chain's relationship to "meatspace" entities, like a foundation or corporation
Since this is more of a social feature than a technical feature, we'll now get into some items that may have been useful to have in a genesis constitution:
What limitations on governance exist, if any?
is it okay for the community to slash the wallet of a whale that they no longer feel that they want around? (viz: Juno Proposal 4 and 16)
can governance "socially slash" a validator who is using unapproved MEV? (viz: commonwealth.im/osmosis)
In the event of an economic emergency, what should validators do?
Terra crash of May, 2022, saw validators choose to run a new binary with code that had not been approved by governance, because the governance token had been inflated to nothing.
What is the purpose of the chain, specifically?
best example of this is the Cosmos hub, where different founding groups, have different interpertations of the purpose of the network.
This genesis entry, "constitution" hasn't been designed for existing chains, who should likely just ratify a constitution using their governance system. Instead, this is for new chains. It will allow for validators to have a much clearer idea of purpose and the expecations placed on them while operating thier nodes. Likewise, for community members, the constitution will give them some idea of what to expect from both the "chain team" and the validators, respectively.
This constitution is designed to be immutable, and placed only in genesis, though that could change over time by a pull request to the cosmos-sdk that allows for the constitution to be changed by governance. Communities whishing to make amendments to their original constitution should use the governance mechanism and a "signaling proposal" to do exactly that.
Ideal use scenario for a cosmos chain constitution
As a chain developer, you decide that you'd like to provide clarity to your key user groups:
validators
token holders
developers (yourself)
You use the constitution to immutably store some Markdown in genesis, so that when difficult questions come up, the constutituon can provide guidance to the community.
Proposals
Proposal
objects are used to tally votes and generally track the proposal's state. They contain an array of arbitrary sdk.Msg
's which the governance module will attempt to resolve and then execute if the proposal passes. Proposal
's are identified by a unique id and contains a series of timestamps: submit_time
, deposit_end_time
, voting_start_time
, voting_end_time
which track the lifecycle of a proposal
A proposal will generally require more than just a set of messages to explain its purpose but need some greater justification and allow a means for interested participants to discuss and debate the proposal. In most cases, it is encouraged to have an off-chain system that supports the on-chain governance process. To accommodate for this, a proposal contains a special metadata
field, a string, which can be used to add context to the proposal. The metadata
field allows custom use for networks, however, it is expected that the field contains a URL or some form of CID using a system such as IPFS. To support the case of interoperability across networks, the SDK recommends that the metadata
represents the following JSON
template:
This makes it far easier for clients to support multiple networks.
The metadata has a maximum length that is chosen by the app developer, and passed into the gov keeper as a config. The default maximum length in the SDK is 255 characters.
Writing a module that uses governance
There are many aspects of a chain, or of the individual modules that you may want to use governance to perform such as changing various parameters. This is very simple to do. First, write out your message types and MsgServer
implementation. Add an authority
field to the keeper which will be populated in the constructor with the governance module account: govKeeper.GetGovernanceAccount().GetAddress()
. Then for the methods in the msg_server.go
, perform a check on the message that the signer matches authority
. This will prevent any user from executing that message.
Parameters and base types
Parameters
define the rules according to which votes are run. There can only be one active parameter set at any given time. If governance wants to change a parameter set, either to modify a value or add/remove a parameter field, a new parameter set has to be created and the previous one rendered inactive.
DepositParams
VotingParams
TallyParams
Parameters are stored in a global GlobalParams
KVStore.
Additionally, we introduce some basic types:
Deposit
ValidatorGovInfo
This type is used in a temp map when tallying
Stores
:::note Stores are KVStores in the multi-store. The key to find the store is the first parameter in the list :::
We will use one KVStore Governance
to store four mappings:
A mapping from
proposalID|'proposal'
toProposal
.A mapping from
proposalID|'addresses'|address
toVote
. This mapping allows us to query all addresses that voted on the proposal along with their vote by doing a range query onproposalID:addresses
.A mapping from
ParamsKey|'Params'
toParams
. This map allows to query all x/gov params.A mapping from
VotingPeriodProposalKeyPrefix|proposalID
to a single byte. This allows us to know if a proposal is in the voting period or not with very low gas cost.
For pseudocode purposes, here are the two function we will use to read or write in stores:
load(StoreKey, Key)
: Retrieve item stored at keyKey
in store found at keyStoreKey
in the multistorestore(StoreKey, Key, value)
: Write valueValue
at keyKey
in store found at keyStoreKey
in the multistore
Proposal Processing Queue
Store:
ProposalProcessingQueue
: A queuequeue[proposalID]
containing all theProposalIDs
of proposals that reachedMinDeposit
. During eachEndBlock
, all the proposals that have reached the end of their voting period are processed. To process a finished proposal, the application tallies the votes, computes the votes of each validator and checks if every validator in the validator set has voted. If the proposal is accepted, deposits are refunded. Finally, the proposal contentHandler
is executed.
And the pseudocode for the ProposalProcessingQueue
:
Legacy Proposal
:::warning Legacy proposals are deprecated. Use the new proposal flow by granting the governance module the right to execute the message. :::
A legacy proposal is the old implementation of governance proposal. Contrary to proposal that can contain any messages, a legacy proposal allows to submit a set of pre-defined proposals. These proposals are defined by their types and handled by handlers that are registered in the gov v1beta1 router.
More information on how to submit proposals in the client section.
Messages
Proposal Submission
Proposals can be submitted by any account via a MsgSubmitProposal
transaction.
All sdk.Msgs
passed into the messages
field of a MsgSubmitProposal
message must be registered in the app's MsgServiceRouter
. Each of these messages must have one signer, namely the gov module account. And finally, the metadata length must not be larger than the maxMetadataLen
config passed into the gov keeper. The initialDeposit
must be strictly positive and conform to the accepted denom of the MinDeposit
param.
State modifications:
Generate new
proposalID
Create new
Proposal
Initialise
Proposal
's attributesDecrease balance of sender by
InitialDeposit
If
MinDeposit
is reached:Push
proposalID
inProposalProcessingQueue
Transfer
InitialDeposit
from theProposer
to the governanceModuleAccount
Deposit
Once a proposal is submitted, if Proposal.TotalDeposit < ActiveParam.MinDeposit
, Atom holders can send MsgDeposit
transactions to increase the proposal's deposit.
A deposit is accepted iff:
The proposal exists
The proposal is not in the voting period
The deposited coins are conform to the accepted denom from the
MinDeposit
param
State modifications:
Decrease balance of sender by
deposit
Add
deposit
of sender inproposal.Deposits
Increase
proposal.TotalDeposit
by sender'sdeposit
If
MinDeposit
is reached:Push
proposalID
inProposalProcessingQueueEnd
Transfer
Deposit
from theproposer
to the governanceModuleAccount
Vote
Once ActiveParam.MinDeposit
is reached, voting period starts. From there, bonded Atom holders are able to send MsgVote
transactions to cast their vote on the proposal.
State modifications:
Record
Vote
of sender
:::note Gas cost for this message has to take into account the future tallying of the vote in EndBlocker. :::
Events
The governance module emits the following events:
EndBlocker
Type | Attribute Key | Attribute Value |
---|---|---|
inactive_proposal | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
inactive_proposal | proposal_result | {proposalResult} |
active_proposal | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
active_proposal | proposal_result | {proposalResult} |
Handlers
MsgSubmitProposal
Type | Attribute Key | Attribute Value |
---|---|---|
submit_proposal | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
submit_proposal [0] | voting_period_start | {proposalID} |
proposal_deposit | amount | {depositAmount} |
proposal_deposit | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
message | module | governance |
message | action | submit_proposal |
message | sender | {senderAddress} |
[0] Event only emitted if the voting period starts during the submission.
MsgVote
Type | Attribute Key | Attribute Value |
---|---|---|
proposal_vote | option | {voteOption} |
proposal_vote | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
message | module | governance |
message | action | vote |
message | sender | {senderAddress} |
MsgVoteWeighted
Type | Attribute Key | Attribute Value |
---|---|---|
proposal_vote | option | {weightedVoteOptions} |
proposal_vote | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
message | module | governance |
message | action | vote |
message | sender | {senderAddress} |
MsgDeposit
Type | Attribute Key | Attribute Value |
---|---|---|
proposal_deposit | amount | {depositAmount} |
proposal_deposit | proposal_id | {proposalID} |
proposal_deposit [0] | voting_period_start | {proposalID} |
message | module | governance |
message | action | deposit |
message | sender | {senderAddress} |
[0] Event only emitted if the voting period starts during the submission.
Parameters
The governance module contains the following parameters:
Key | Type | Example |
---|---|---|
min_deposit | array (coins) | [{"denom":"uatom","amount":"10000000"}] |
max_deposit_period | string (time ns) | "172800000000000" (17280s) |
voting_period | string (time ns) | "172800000000000" (17280s) |
quorum | string (dec) | "0.334000000000000000" |
threshold | string (dec) | "0.500000000000000000" |
veto | string (dec) | "0.334000000000000000" |
expedited_threshold | string (time ns) | "0.667000000000000000" |
expedited_voting_period | string (time ns) | "86400000000000" (8600s) |
expedited_min_deposit | array (coins) | [{"denom":"uatom","amount":"50000000"}] |
burn_proposal_deposit_prevote | bool | false |
burn_vote_quorum | bool | false |
burn_vote_veto | bool | true |
min_initial_deposit_ratio | string | "0.1" |
NOTE: The governance module contains parameters that are objects unlike other modules. If only a subset of parameters are desired to be changed, only they need to be included and not the entire parameter object structure.
Client
CLI
A user can query and interact with the gov
module using the CLI.
Query
The query
commands allow users to query gov
state.
deposit
The deposit
command allows users to query a deposit for a given proposal from a given depositor.
Example:
Example Output:
deposits
The deposits
command allows users to query all deposits for a given proposal.
Example:
Example Output:
param
The param
command allows users to query a given parameter for the gov
module.
Example:
Example Output:
params
The params
command allows users to query all parameters for the gov
module.
Example:
Example Output:
proposal
The proposal
command allows users to query a given proposal.
Example:
Example Output:
proposals
The proposals
command allows users to query all proposals with optional filters.
Example:
Example Output:
proposer
The proposer
command allows users to query the proposer for a given proposal.
Example:
Example Output:
tally
The tally
command allows users to query the tally of a given proposal vote.
Example:
Example Output:
vote
The vote
command allows users to query a vote for a given proposal.
Example:
Example Output:
votes
The votes
command allows users to query all votes for a given proposal.
Example:
Example Output:
Transactions
The tx
commands allow users to interact with the gov
module.
deposit
The deposit
command allows users to deposit tokens for a given proposal.
Example:
draft-proposal
The draft-proposal
command allows users to draft any type of proposal. The command returns a draft_proposal.json
, to be used by submit-proposal
after being completed. The draft_metadata.json
is meant to be uploaded to IPFS.
submit-proposal
The submit-proposal
command allows users to submit a governance proposal along with some messages and metadata. Messages, metadata and deposit are defined in a JSON file.
Example:
where proposal.json
contains:
:::note By default the metadata, summary and title are both limited by 255 characters, this can be overridden by the application developer. :::
:::tip When metadata is not specified, the title is limited to 255 characters and the summary 40x the title length. :::
submit-legacy-proposal
The submit-legacy-proposal
command allows users to submit a governance legacy proposal along with an initial deposit.
Example:
Example (param-change
):
cancel-proposal
Once proposal is canceled, from the deposits of proposal deposits * proposal_cancel_ratio
will be burned or sent to ProposalCancelDest
address , if ProposalCancelDest
is empty then deposits will be burned. The remaining deposits
will be sent to depositers.
Example:
vote
The vote
command allows users to submit a vote for a given governance proposal.
Example:
weighted-vote
The weighted-vote
command allows users to submit a weighted vote for a given governance proposal.
Example:
gRPC
A user can query the gov
module using gRPC endpoints.
Proposal
The Proposal
endpoint allows users to query a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Proposals
The Proposals
endpoint allows users to query all proposals with optional filters.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Vote
The Vote
endpoint allows users to query a vote for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Votes
The Votes
endpoint allows users to query all votes for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Params
The Params
endpoint allows users to query all parameters for the gov
module.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Deposit
The Deposit
endpoint allows users to query a deposit for a given proposal from a given depositor.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
deposits
The Deposits
endpoint allows users to query all deposits for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
TallyResult
The TallyResult
endpoint allows users to query the tally of a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
REST
A user can query the gov
module using REST endpoints.
proposal
The proposals
endpoint allows users to query a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
proposals
The proposals
endpoint also allows users to query all proposals with optional filters.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
voter vote
The votes
endpoint allows users to query a vote for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
votes
The votes
endpoint allows users to query all votes for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
params
The params
endpoint allows users to query all parameters for the gov
module.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
deposits
The deposits
endpoint allows users to query a deposit for a given proposal from a given depositor.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
proposal deposits
The deposits
endpoint allows users to query all deposits for a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
tally
The tally
endpoint allows users to query the tally of a given proposal.
Using legacy v1beta1:
Example:
Example Output:
Using v1:
Example:
Example Output:
Metadata
The gov module has two locations for metadata where users can provide further context about the on-chain actions they are taking. By default all metadata fields have a 255 character length field where metadata can be stored in json format, either on-chain or off-chain depending on the amount of data required. Here we provide a recommendation for the json structure and where the data should be stored. There are two important factors in making these recommendations. First, that the gov and group modules are consistent with one another, note the number of proposals made by all groups may be quite large. Second, that client applications such as block explorers and governance interfaces have confidence in the consistency of metadata structure accross chains.
Proposal
Location: off-chain as json object stored on IPFS (mirrors group proposal)
:::note The authors
field is an array of strings, this is to allow for multiple authors to be listed in the metadata. In v0.46, the authors
field is a comma-separated string. Frontends are encouraged to support both formats for backwards compatibility. :::
Vote
Location: on-chain as json within 255 character limit (mirrors group vote)
Future Improvements
The current documentation only describes the minimum viable product for the governance module. Future improvements may include:
BountyProposals
: If accepted, aBountyProposal
creates an open bounty. TheBountyProposal
specifies how many Atoms will be given upon completion. These Atoms will be taken from thereserve pool
. After aBountyProposal
is accepted by governance, anybody can submit aSoftwareUpgradeProposal
with the code to claim the bounty. Note that once aBountyProposal
is accepted, the corresponding funds in thereserve pool
are locked so that payment can always be honored. In order to link aSoftwareUpgradeProposal
to an open bounty, the submitter of theSoftwareUpgradeProposal
will use theProposal.LinkedProposal
attribute. If aSoftwareUpgradeProposal
linked to an open bounty is accepted by governance, the funds that were reserved are automatically transferred to the submitter.Complex delegation: Delegators could choose other representatives than their validators. Ultimately, the chain of representatives would always end up to a validator, but delegators could inherit the vote of their chosen representative before they inherit the vote of their validator. In other words, they would only inherit the vote of their validator if their other appointed representative did not vote.
Better process for proposal review: There would be two parts to
proposal.Deposit
, one for anti-spam (same as in MVP) and an other one to reward third party auditors.
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